



BAJIRAO IAS ACADEMY

THE HINDU ANALYSIS

8 MAY 2025

**OPERATION
SINDOOR**

**INDIA'S MISSILE
STRIKES ON PAKISTAN**



OPERATION SINDOOR

Indian forces hit Pakistan terror bases

24 precision strikes carried out on bases across 9 sites used to train terrorists in Pakistan and PoK

Air defence network on 'highest state' of alert in anticipation of counter-response from Pakistan

Targets destroyed without harming any civilian population, as per plan, says Defence Minister

Dinakar Peri
NEW DELHI

In a swift and decisive military action under Operation Sindoor against terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), the Indian armed forces carried out 24 precision strikes on nine different targets within a span of just 25 minutes in the early hours of Wednesday.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said India exercised its "right to respond" to an attack on its soil, referring to the Pahalgam attack, and the armed forces "scripted history" by acting with "precision, precaution, and compassion" to destroy the camps used to train terrorists in Pakistan and PoK.

The entire air defence network has been put on the highest state of alert in anticipation of any coun-



Targeted sites in Pakistan belong to terror groups across the border at distances ranging from 6 km to 100 km

Armed forces carry out 24 precision strikes on targets in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir under Operation Sindoor



Swift action: Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri at a press briefing on the military strikes on terror bases in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir on Wednesday. SHIV KUMAR PUSHPAKAR

'Precision capability' strikes conducted between 1.05 a.m. and 1.30 a.m. on Wednesday

5 sites hit in PoK and 4 across the International Border

Action limited only to the camps and infrastructure used for training terrorists, with the aim of breaking their morale, says Defence Minister

12 J&K civilians, one soldier killed in Pak. shelling

SRINAGAR/JAMMU One soldier and at least 12 civilians, three women and three children among them, were killed and 51 injured as the Pakistan Army resorted to heavy mortar shelling and firing in four districts close to the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir on Wednesday. Indian Army said it was responding in a "proportionate manner". » PAGE 13

ter-response from Pakistan.

"India has demonstrated considerable restraint in its response. However, Indian armed forces are fully prepared to respond to Pakistani misadventure, if any, to escalate the situation," Wing Commander Vyomika Singh said at a

media briefing during the day, which was led by Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri.

'Non-escalatory action' Mr. Misri said India exercised its right to act on terror targets, stressing that the actions were "measured, non-escalatory, pro-

portionate, and responsible".

"The action was carried out very thoughtfully and in a measured manner. It was limited only to the camps and other infrastructure used for training terrorists, with the aim of breaking their morale," the Defence Minister said

while addressing the 66th Raising Day event of the Border Roads Organisation (BRO).

He asserted that as per plan, the targets were destroyed and no civilian population was harmed.

"No Pakistani military facilities have been targeted. India has demonstrat-

ed considerable restraint in selection of targets and method of execution," the Ministry said.

"We are living up to the commitment that those responsible for the Pahalgam attack will be held accountable," it added.

Meanwhile, Pakistan Army spokesperson Lt. Gen-

eral Ahmad Sharif Chaudhry claimed that 31 people were killed and 57 injured in the strikes.

CONTINUED ON

» PAGE 12

EDITORIAL

» PAGE 8

RELATED REPORTS ON

» PAGES 4, 7, 12, 13, & 14



Context

- ❑ The Indian military launched multiple missile attacks targeting sites (“terrorist infrastructure”) in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir in an attack it called Operation Sindoor.
- ❑ The missiles were India’s response to the deadly April 22 attack on tourists in Kashmir in Pahalgam, during which 26 men were killed.

What is Operation Sindoor?

- ❑ Operation Sindoor is a meticulously planned military offensive targeting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK). It wasn't just a big strike against terror infrastructure.
- ❑ It was the biggest anti-terror operation inside Pakistan, and the biggest military strike since the 1971 War.
- ❑ The immediate reason cited for the operation was to “deliver justice” to the victims of the Pahalgam terror attack.
- ❑ However, India framed Operation Sindoor not as a one-off reaction but as a response to decades of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, dating back to the 2001 Indian Parliament attack.

Doctrine of Sub-Conventional Targeting

- India maintained its doctrine of limited strikes — targeting terror infrastructure, not the Pakistan military.
- Similar to the **2016 surgical strikes and the 2019 Balakot airstrikes**, Operation Sindoor:
- Avoided escalation into full-scale war.
- Sent a signal that terrorism will be met with proportional and precise force.
- **The Ministry of Defence stated that** “No Pakistani military facilities have been targeted.”
- This indicates an effort to retain strategic restraint while demonstrating operational resolve.

Operation Sindoor

Indian armed forces on May 7, 2025, carried out missile strikes on nine terror targets in Pakistan and Pakistan-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir.



Key Military Operations by India Against Pakistan

- ❑ **Operation Ablaze (1965):** Pre-emptive mobilisation by the Indian Army in April 1965 after the Rann of Kutch clashes; demonstrated India's readiness before the August war.
- ❑ **Operation Riddle (1965):** India's military response to Pakistan's infiltrations (Ops Gibraltar and Grand Slam) in J&K; led to full-scale war and ended with the **Tashkent Agreement**.
- ❑ **Operation Cactus Lily (1971):** Major Indian offensive in East Pakistan; involved Meghna River crossing, aiding rapid advance to Dhaka and aiding Bangladesh's liberation.
- ❑ **Operation Trident (1971):** Indian Navy's successful missile strike on Karachi harbour on Dec 4; caused major damage to Pakistan's navy and fuel reserves.
- ❑ **Operation Python (1971):** Follow-up naval strike on Karachi post-Trident; further damaged Pakistan's naval assets and disrupted logistics.
- ❑ **Operation Meghdoot (1984):** India's pre-emptive occupation of Siachen Glacier; secured key passes like **Bilafond La and Sia La** to deny Pakistan control.

- ❑ **Operation Vijay (1999):** Military operation during the Kargil War to evict Pakistani intruders from Indian territory along the LoC; restored status quo.
- ❑ **Operation Safed Sagar (1999):** IAF's air campaign during Kargil conflict; targeted enemy positions at high altitude to assist ground operations.
- ❑ **2016 Surgical Strikes:** Cross-LoC strike by Indian Special Forces targeting terror launch pads in PoK post-Uri attack; marked shift in India's response doctrine.
- ❑ **Operation Bandar (2019):** IAF air strike on JeM camp in Balakot post-Pulwama attack; first cross-LoC air raid since 1971, led to India-Pak aerial face-off.
- ❑ **Operation Sindoor (2025):** Precision air strikes by India on **21 terror camps across PoK** and Pakistan in retaliation for the Pahalgam attack; showcased tech-driven retaliation.

INDIA-U.S ENERGY FUTURE

The building blocks of an India-U.S. energy future

United States Vice-President J.D. Vance recently highlighted the U.S.'s willingness to cooperate with India more closely on energy and defence. India's foreign policy establishment outlined the need for cooperation on energy, defence technology and the mobility of people. The developments may have been news, but the issues are not new. These topics have increasingly defined India-U.S. relations over the years despite changes in administration, but with some change in emphasis. There is an opportunity now for renewed investment in them.

India's energy security will be guided by three imperatives: having sufficient energy resources at predictable prices, minimal disruptions in supply chains, and progress towards an increasingly sustainable energy mix. Nuclear energy and critical minerals will matter in these respects and can be the bedrock of further deepening energy and technology partnership between Washington and New Delhi.

A critical minerals compact

The energy transition will unfold not only via electrons but also with elements. China's restrictions in April on exports of rare earths were just the latest move in periodic disruptions for more than a decade. On the one hand, China controls nearly 90% of global rare earth processing capacity. On the other, it leverages this market power to serve its strategic purposes. The result: the minerals needed for new energy technologies, advanced electronics or defence equipment are contingent on fragile global supply chains.

In 2024, India and the U.S. signed a memorandum of understanding to diversify these supply chains. Three principles must now guide India-U.S. cooperation on critical minerals.

First, critical minerals must be viewed as the pillar of multiple sectors, and not just as a mining silo. They are needed across the economy – and in the strategic sectors on which India and the U.S. wish to collaborate. This broad framing prioritises long-term strategy and enables cross-sectoral skills and technology exchange.

Second, policies for critical minerals must play out at bilateral and plurilateral levels. They must establish guarantees of supply and frameworks for cooperation. Demand creation, not supply coercion, must drive this relationship. An India-U.S. critical minerals consortium could look into joint exploration and processing, India, with its emerging mineral exploration base, and the U.S., with its deep capital and technology, should co-invest in third-country projects across Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia.

Beyond the bilateral relationship, the Quad (including Japan and Australia) can be a capability multiplier. This includes collaboration on minerals processing technology. Further, data



Arunabha Ghosh
is the CEO of Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEWW).

transparency and traceability of these minerals are crucial. For this, establish a dedicated India-U.S. Mineral Exchange – a secure digital platform for real-time trade, investment, and collaboration on critical minerals. This can especially help vulnerable industries such as electric vehicles, aerospace, and semiconductors. India and the U.S. should also co-develop a blockchain-based traceability standard for critical minerals, inspired by the EU's Battery Passport.

Moreover, India and the U.S. should build joint strategic stockpiles of key minerals to safeguard supply chains against geopolitical or trade disruptions, leveraging existing storage infrastructure in both countries (such as India's Strategic Petroleum Reserves or the US National Defense Stockpile) for cost-effective deployment. India has made early moves – becoming the first non-G-7 member of the Mineral Security Partnership – and it will host the Quad summit later this year. It is an opportunity to formalise these specific approaches. The Quad countries are also exploring joint engagement with mineral-rich nations.

Third, patience will be key. While a battery plant may take two years to build, exploration of mines and building processing facilities take between 12 to 16 years. A durable India-U.S. critical minerals partnership must be structured with a 20-year horizon and interim targets, consistent with the initial goals of India's own Critical Minerals Mission. To realise these ambitions, India and the U.S. must also invest in the 'plumbing' of the energy partnership: data-sharing protocols, investment tracking, workforce development, and innovation corridors under platforms such as the U.S.-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (ICET).

Nuclear energy as next frontier of linkages
As India's electricity demand surges, we need a reliable source that complements the intermittency of solar and wind to build a stable, secure grid. Even as battery costs have fallen dramatically, nuclear power offers another firm, low-carbon source essential to achieving India's net-zero goals.

India has an ambitious goal of achieving 100 GW of nuclear power capacity by 2047. Converting this into action will need a shift in momentum. Currently, nuclear energy contributes just over 4 GW, or about 2% of India's installed capacity. To meet the 2047 target, India must commission approximately 5GW-6 GW annually from the early 2030s. Studies by institutions, including the Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEWW), suggest that achieving net zero by 2070 could require nuclear capacity exceeding 200 GW under certain scenarios.

To realise this vision, India must implement

three pivotal reforms. First, shorten deployment timelines to ensure scale. Reducing the build time of nuclear projects from, say, nine to six years could cut the levelised cost of electricity by 8%.

This calls for standardised designs, faster approvals, and skilled project delivery. Second, enable private sector participation. That means having credible offerors to reduce risks, structure competitive bids, and offer long-term purchase commitments. Small Modular Reactors, with their lower capex and flexibility and lower land requirement, become bankable only when private capital has clear incentives and predictable returns. Applications include the use of nuclear energy for green steel or to service rapidly rising demand for Artificial Intelligence. The overall capital requirement for 100 GW of nuclear power is enormous: up to \$180 billion by 2047. The exposure of domestic banks and non-banking financial companies to the power sector is approximately \$200 billion. We must rewire our financial system to support this transition. The growth of nuclear as a viable source of energy and international cooperation rests on assurances of clear policies and offtake and payment guarantees, collaboration with global firms for tech transfer and co-creation, and rules and standards for waste management.

Issue of safety

Third, amend the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 to enable private investments in nuclear power plants. India's indigenous reactor designs can be modularised. The recent approval for Holtec International to transfer SMR technology to Indian companies, including Larsen & Toubro and Tata Consulting Engineers, is an example of the potential of India-U.S. collaboration in this direction. However, India should always prioritise nuclear safety by adopting advanced waste handling and decommissioning technologies, especially as it could lead the manufacturing of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). With smaller emergency zones and air-cooling capability, SMRs suit water-scarce regions but demand robust, centralised waste management and repurposing strategies from the start.

The IMF's World Economic Outlook report (April 2025) shows concerning levels of global uncertainty amid trade and tariff tensions. For India's energy security and sustainable economic development, bilateral relations between India and the U.S. must offer greater assurance in strategic and shared interests. India's continued growth story and the U.S.'s technological prowess and capital are mutually complementary. A resilient energy future needs a long-term vision, not just the pursuit of short-term wins, a road map, and a resilient architecture of cooperation.

The views expressed are personal +

Context:


- ❑ U.S. Vice-President J.D. Vance recently reaffirmed cooperation with India on energy and defence, while India highlighted energy security, technology transfer, and critical minerals as key bilateral focus areas.

India joins US-led Mineral Security Network to secure critical minerals, fend off Chinese challenge

The Minerals Security Finance Network (MSFN) is a new initiative that stems from the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), a framework established by the US in 2022. India was inducted to the MSP in June 2023.


About India–USA Energy Programs

- ❑ **Strategic Clean Energy Partnership (SCEP):** Covers biofuels, solar, hydrogen, and energy efficiency.
- ❑ **U.S.-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET):** Focuses on clean tech, AI, quantum, and SMRs (Small Modular Reactors).
- ❑ **Nuclear Energy Cooperation:** Includes technology transfer and potential investment in India's 100 GW nuclear goal.
- ❑ **Critical Minerals MoU (2024):** Targets resilient mineral supply chains and third-country co-investment.



Why Is Such a Partnership Needed?

- ❑ **Energy Security** as India needs predictable energy supply with minimal disruption to fuel its \$5-trillion economy goal. E.g. India's energy import bill crossed \$153 billion in FY24.
- ❑ **Climate Goals** **Net-zero by 2070** needs diversified low-carbon energy including nuclear, renewables, and green hydrogen.
- ❑ **Supply Chain Resilience** as China controls 90% of rare earth processing — India needs alternate, democratic mineral partnerships.
- ❑ **Infrastructure Financing** as Nuclear power alone may need \$180 billion by 2047, demanding global capital and technology infusion.



Way Ahead

- ❑ Amend the **Civil Liability Act to allow foreign and private capital** in India's nuclear sector.- Holtec's SMR tech transfer to L&T & Tata Consulting needs legal safeguards.
- ❑ **Joint Strategic Mineral Stockpiling**: Use India's Petroleum Reserves and U.S. National Defense Stockpile to hedge supply risks.
- ❑ **Launch India US Mineral Exchange** and Create a secure digital hub for traceability, trade, and co-investment using blockchain.
- ❑ **Quad as Multiplier**: Expand trilateral mineral partnerships with Australia & Japan for processing, R&D, and African outreach.
- ❑ **Fast-Track Nuclear Deployment** ,Standardise designs, cut approval time, and build 5–6 GW of nuclear annually by early 2030s.
- ❑ Restructure domestic lending and **enable green bonds** or multilateral funding for nuclear and minerals.

PAKISTAN, BANGLADESH & IDENTITY QUESTION

Pakistan, Bangladesh and core identity questions

Pakistan reveals a tumultuous confluence of unresolved identity, ideological rigidity, persistent reliance on proxy warfare, and selective amnesia. Two events – seemingly distinct but deeply entangled – have reignited the foundational questions about what Pakistan is and what it seeks to remain.

Events of contrast

On one front, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, General Asim Munir, delivered a speech that resurrected the ghosts of the two-nation theory, the ideological foundation upon which Muhammad Ali Jinnah led the movement for the creation of Pakistan. In April, at the Overseas Pakistanis Convention in Islamabad, Gen. Munir declared that people of Pakistan are "fundamentally different" from Hindus – by religion, by tradition, by culture, and by ambition. "Our forefathers thought we were different in every possible aspect of life," he remarked, invoking the foundational narrative of Pakistan's birth. His language and tone were nostalgic, divisive and arrogant – an impassioned appeal to safeguard Jinnah's ideological legacy from being forgotten.

A day later, in Dhaka, Bangladesh asked Pakistan to account for the horrors of its disgusting past. During the first Foreign Secretary-level talks in 15 years, Bangladesh's Foreign Secretary demanded a long-awaited apology for the atrocities committed by Pakistan's army during the 1971 Liberation War. Even though the current regime in Bangladesh is courting Pakistan, the demand for confession of guilt is not merely ironic – it is a regrettable theatre of amnesia couched as strategic pragmatism. However, Pakistan's role during the birth of Bangladesh is an episode of colossal brutality that it still echoes in the nation's soul. Along with the apology for a horrendous campaign of systematic repression, Bangladesh has reiterated its demand for more than \$4 billion in reparations – its share of undivided Pakistan's assets, including aid, pension funds and other state resources.

The irony here could not be starker, perhaps even tragic. It is a moment rich in historical contradiction: while Pakistan's security establishment affirms the hypothesis that



Vinay Kaura

is Assistant Professor of International Affairs and Security Studies at Sardar Patel University of Police, Security and Criminal Justice, Rajasthan, and Non-Resident Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore

Partition was imperative and morally justified, its former eastern wing – once tethered by fraud and fiction – demands accountability for the violent consequences of that very Partition gone awry, before formal reconciliation can be pursued.

A theory, its reinforcement, the gaps

The two-nation theory argued that Muslims and Hindus were fundamentally distinct communities, defined by religious and cultural cleavages, and, therefore, could not function cohesively within a unified political framework once colonial rule ended in the Indian subcontinent. But this ideological assertion was not just a political device; it became a deeply embedded mythos, reinforced by the Pakistan state through textbooks and speeches. Yet, the theory contained its own seeds of disintegration. When the cultural and linguistic aspirations of Bengalis of East Pakistan were contemptuously denied, their votes in democratic elections utterly disrespected, and their cultural identity brutally suppressed by the Punjabi elite in Islamabad, the very logic of the two-nation theory turned in upon itself.

Gen. Munir's speech, then, needs to be understood not merely as a reaffirmation of a discredited ideology, but as an act of forgetting – a deliberate effacement of South Asian history's inconvenient lessons. It is a return to the familiar comforts of a useless theory that promises certainty in a world increasingly defined by ambiguity and fracture. But such affirmations, no matter how forcefully delivered, do not address the economic, political and security challenges that Pakistan faces.

Pakistan has never formally apologised for the atrocities against Bengalis, with successive regimes either denying or downplaying the violence, sometimes blaming rogue elements. Disturbingly, Pakistan appears ready to repeat the same pattern of repression in Balochistan, unapologetically demonstrating similar aggression, denial and unwillingness to engage politically with legitimate grievances. Instead of learning from its mistakes in East Pakistan, Rawalpindi seems trapped in a cycle of dictatorial responses to dissent, reinforcing the very divisions that once led to Pakistan's

disintegration. The ideological orientation of the current Bangladeshi regime – emerging after Sheikh Hasina's ouster – represents not a principled shift but rather an opportunistic recalibration, driven by misguided beliefs that are causing significant tensions within the top echelons of the regime in Dhaka and in the relationship between the regime and many of the citizens, particularly as it seeks to distance itself from India and strengthen ties with Pakistan. Nonetheless, for most of the Bangladeshi people, the catastrophic events of 1971 are not matters of distant historical record; they are vivid inter-generational memories, reinforced by the collective trauma surrounding the nation's birth.

So profound is the burden of this trauma that it has driven the Dhaka regime to demand both a formal apology and reparations from Pakistan, even as Bangladesh signals a pragmatic turn toward normalisation. However, the demand for moral and material accountability is not driven by vindictiveness, but serves as a cathartic plea for the minimal recognition of responsibility from the aggressor. That Pakistan continues to withhold such recognition is indicative not merely of ideological obstinacy, but of a deeper pathology.

One must ask Pakistan's hybrid regime: what, precisely, has been gained through the repetition of ideology at the expense of self-examination? Has the invocation of the two-nation theory made Pakistan more cohesive, more egalitarian, or more at peace with its neighbours – or even with itself? The consequential question now is whether Pakistan can craft a national identity rooted in its own values and aspirations, not just in opposition to the 'Indian other'.

The two-nation theory may have been the genesis of Pakistan, but its emotionalism and divisiveness make it a very poor and inadequate guide for national action. As military tensions escalate in the wake of Indian airstrikes on terror camps in Pakistan following the Pahalgam terror attack, the dangers of following the theory are thrown into stark relief. The hybrid regime, grappling with the riddle of the Imran Khan phenomenon, the ongoing insurgency in Balochistan, and strained relations with the Afghan Taliban, can find little solace in the obsolete concept of the two-nation theory.

Context

❑ Recent developments — **Pakistan Army Chief Gen. Asim Munir's** speech reasserting the **Two-Nation Theory**, and Bangladesh's demand for apology and reparations for the 1971 war atrocities — have reopened **South Asia's unresolved historical and ideological questions**, exposing Pakistan's continued reliance on religious nationalism, historical denialism, and internal repression.

Reassertion of Ideology by Pakistan

- ❑ Pakistan's Army Chief General Asim Munir, in April 2025, invoked the **Two-Nation Theory**, claiming Muslims and Hindus are “fundamentally different” in religion, tradition, culture, and ambition, thereby reinforcing **religious essentialism as the basis of national identity**.
- ❑ **Use of Nationalism as Political Distraction** as The speech reflects an attempt to distract from Pakistan's internal crises — including political instability, economic fragility, and insurgency — by reviving outdated ideological tropes rooted in Jinnah's vision of separation.
- ❑ The **Two-Nation Theory** continues to be institutionally propagated through school curricula and public discourse, **entrenching a narrow and divisive sense of national identity**, despite its historical contradictions post-1971



TWO NATION THEORY

Mohamed Ali Jinnah, President of the Muslim League presented the argument of the Two Nation Theory. He stated that the Muslims of India were significantly different from the Hindu majority to the extent that the Muslims of India represented their own separate nation.

Historians and scholars will forever debate the merits of these arguments. However Jinnah and the Muslim League could not secure a workable agreement with the Congress Party on forming a government in an independent nation. The partitioning of the sub-continent into two separate countries became the only alternative.

Rioting among Hindus and Muslims saw mounting death tolls.

Bangladesh's Counter-Narrative

- ❑ In April 2025, during Foreign Secretary-level talks, **Bangladesh formally demanded a long-pending apology for Pakistan Army's atrocities** during the 1971 Liberation War and sought over USD 4 billion in reparations for its share of undivided Pakistan's assets.
- ❑ Despite **signs of diplomatic normalisation with Pakistan**, 1971 remains a core issue in Bangladesh's national consciousness, creating a paradox between strategic engagement and collective trauma.
- ❑ **Moral Assertion over Strategic Realism**
as Bangladesh's demand is rooted in ethical recognition of state-sponsored brutality, not strategic hostility — signifying a principled stance for historical justice, rather than a purely transactional foreign policy.



Implications of Ideological Rigidity for Pakistan

- ❑ The continued denial of ethnic-linguistic grievances, seen earlier in **East Pakistan and now in Balochistan**, shows Pakistan's repetition of authoritarian patterns, ignoring lessons from its own disintegration in 1971.
- ❑ Pakistan's identity remains **reactive and India-centric**, defined by contrast rather than internal coherence, thus limiting national integration and foreign policy maturity.
- ❑ The persistent invocation of the **Two-Nation Theory** does not address modern threats like terrorism, separatism, and regional isolation; instead, it entrenches militarised nationalism devoid of democratic introspection.





Thank you

Address

**B-47, Main Road Shivalik Enclave, Block-
B, Shivalik Colony, Malviya Nagar, New
Delhi-110017**

Phone Number +91 8178833167